Such component process (CP) theories generally predict that the amount of priming depends on the degree of overlap between the stimulus-specific processes engaged during initial and subsequent presentations (Franks, Bilbrey, Lien & McNamara, 2000 Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). For example, faster visual identification of the stimulus (a perceptual process) and/or faster extraction of task-relevant semantic information (a conceptual process) might also contribute to the shorter RTs for primed stimuli. These S–R accounts of priming contrast with the common conception that priming reflects the facilitation of one or more of the cognitive processes that were engaged during initial presentation of the stimulus (Blaxton, 1989 Roediger & McDermott, 1993 Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1993). We conclude that S–R bindings simultaneously represent both stimuli and responses at multiple levels of abstraction. Nonetheless, the size of this reversal effect was smaller for such across-format (e.g., word–picture) repetition than for within-format (e.g., picture–picture) repetition, suggesting additional coding of format-specific stimulus representations.
FORMATMATCH DOWNLOAD CODE
Across two experiments, we found effects of response reversal on priming when switching between object pictures and object names, consistent with S–R bindings that code stimuli at an abstract level.
Using an experimental design that reverses responses at all of these levels, we assessed whether S–R bindings also code multiple levels of stimulus representation. S–R bindings have recently been shown to simultaneously code multiple levels of response representation, from specific Motor-actions to more abstract Decisions (“yes”/”no”) and Classifications (e.g., “man-made”/”natural”). Repetition priming can be caused by the rapid retrieval of previously encoded stimulus–response (S–R) bindings.
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